On August 6th elements of four Ukrainian brigades in an initial force of 2,000 men crossed the Ukrainian-Russian border into Russia's Kursk province opposite the small town of Sudzha. They disarmed and captured a sizeable Russian unit of FSB border guards at the border crossing, then quickly captured territory several kilometers in depth against light resistance, and had reconnaissance units fan out several more, so that Ukrainian presence was observed in over ten Russian settlements on just the first day of the invasion, and ultimately rising to twenty. By best estimates after three days 350 km2 of Russia lies under Ukrainian army control.

It is very clear that the Russian side was taken by surprise. Probably, as often happens, the Ukrainian build-up was to some extent observed and reported up the chain, but since it was deduced by the brass that a Ukrainian offensive here "wouldn't make sense" nothing was done. Reserves were not allocated and brought in in advance, and at least some units were not tactically and psychologically ready to face a large incursion (rather than special forces raids of 5-8 men which are common on both sides).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSvrNTfQPQY

Nonetheless, it should be noted that the advent of the small drone era has changed how Ukrainians and Russians conceive of defense, especially in inactive theaters. Rather than presenting a heavily manned line of contact that would present numerous targets for drones and drone-guided artillery, the advanced positions are lightly manned, with the main fortification line running some 10 kilometers behind them. (This was the Russian approach in 2023, and the Ukrainian approach in Vochansk earlier this year.) Thus some degree of Ukrainian penetration was always to be expected, even if the Russians had prepared perfectly.

That said, nothing should be taken away from the Ukrainian preparations which were meticulous and skillful. Communication towers in the area had been hit one by one in the weeks preceding, and a heavy concentration of air defenses, electronic warfare systems, and drones were assembled in support.

Moreover where the Russians in the May 2024 Kharkov offensive "solved" the problem of how to conduct rapid offense in the drone age, by falling back on infantry marches on foot through forests and swamps using infiltration tactics, the Ukrainians in Kursk have been able to showcase a combined-arms operation with a strong tank and mechanized component.

It should also be pointed out that the Ukrainian incursion takes place a wider context of Ukrainian manpower disadvantage and setbacks in Donetsk. Outnumbered, the Ukrainians have been steadily falling back in a number of important sectors in the south, especially on the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk axis, allowing Russian gains of up to 10 km2 per day, albeit in return for well over 100 dead on each side daily.

It is for this reason that as the news of the Ukrainian foray into Kursk hit, many Ukrainian commentators were initially critical and confused. With the Ukrainian forces in the south already on the back foot due to a manpower shortage, what sense did it make to divert some of the last reserves to open a new front? Especially since Russia does not use conscripts serving out their mandatory, universal national service in Ukraine, but it does use them on Russian borders. So in theory the Russians could fight this new Ukrainian offensive with just Rosgvardia, FSB border troops, and especially conscripts, without even having to divert any of the enlisted units from Ukraine.

But regardless of these risks, the operation presents several big upsides for Ukraine:

1. Moscow has been often repeating that Russia is open to peace but that any peace will have to be "based on realities as they exist on the ground". But with Ukraine in control of 300 square kilometers of Russia, it makes Putin's insistence on the "facts on the ground" formula quite comical.

2. In May Putin ordered an offensive to carve out what he deemed a "sanitary zone" on the Russian-Ukrainian border opposite the Russian city of Belgorod. Not only did that effort flounder within days, but humiliatingly for Putin, Zelensky has now matched Russian gains in Kharkov, with Ukrainian gains in Kursk, while playing a weaker hand.

3. In theory Russia can attempt to contain and roll back the Ukrainian offensive with conscript units, without transferring over units made up of enlisted men from Ukraine and weakening its offensive there, but these units are untested. And while all else being equal, 19-year old conscripts make for more dynamic troops than the 40-year-olds who make up the enlisted volunteer units, the all-conscript units on the border lack combat experience, equipment, and most of all leadership, with the bulk of best officers deployed to Ukraine. Thus it is not immediately clear that conscripts will be up to the task. Until they prove their mettle relying on them presents a risk for the Russian side, and forces a serious strategic dilemma on the Russian leadership.

Keep in mind that in the pre-war 2022 Russian army all-conscript units did not exist at all and were not foreseen. Conscripts were supposed to fill up positions in mixed units which would have placed them alongside numerous experienced professional soldiers ("kontraktniki"), and with an emphasis on filling supporting roles (loaders, drivers...).

4. The question of whether to pursue a defense and counter-offensive with conscripts also presents a serious political dilemma that has been foisted on Putin. Legally there are no obstacles to doing so. However ever since Moscow declared its annexation of four Ukrainian provinces in the south in September 2022, there have also been no legal obstacles to using conscripts serving out their mandatory national service in Ukraine, and yet this has never been done. Is Putin willing to send 19-year-olds into heavy combat and will he pay a political price on the home front if he does so? We don't know, but we know that so far he has gone to great lengths to avoid doing so. (Where Ukrainians are concerned men under 25 are exempt from mobilization wholesale and serve only if they volunteer.)

An additional political challenge for Putin lies in the fact that even should Russia recapture the lost settlements these are likely going to be leveled in the process with artillery and glide bombs.

5. There are many episodes of this war that Ukraine can and will remember with fondness. Episodes that served to lift its spirit, link its people in a shared experience, and even help to complete its national formation. Highlights such as the sinking of the Moskva cruiser, the lightning Kupyansk-Liman offensive of September 2022, the forcing of the Russian evacuation of Snake Island and of Kherson, and several others. However, overwhelmingly these feel-good moments happened in the first year of the war, and have been wholly absent in 2024. A nation at war does not live by bread alone — and the Ukrainian drive into Kursk province will at least for a short time remind Ukrainians of 2022 victories and link them in hope, anticipation, and pride. This is important and invaluable. Especially in a context where all other news is of a bleak meatgrinder and very small but unending retreats.

It remains to be seen if this strike will prove a good use of war potential for Ukraine in a purely material sense (and the answer is more likely to be no than yes), but in the non-material dimension of war it is likely to be a resounding and much needed success for Ukraine, even if it is eventually forced to retreat. (The caveat being that the big danger for the Ukrainians is if they try to hold onto for too long once they become enveloped as they did in Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Krynky, as commanded by Zelensky out of non-military calculations.)

All this said, the glacial, but relentless Russian advance in the south continues, especially in the Pokrovsk direction, chipping away 5-10 km2 every day. It is this main theater of the war that will have a greater influence on its outcome than any secondary actions in the north.

---

One interpretation of Ukrainian gains so far. The road to west in purple has been mined by Ukraine:

The Ukrainian push renders the railway line running through Sudzha unusable, cutting down the number of available railway lines from Kursk to Belgorod from two to one, slightly complicating Russian logistics:

In one interpretation the Ukrainian objectives are the towns of Rylsk and Lgov to the north, and the Kursk nuclear power plant to the northeast. Personally, I find this to be too ambitious, but food for thought nonetheless:

https://www.youtube.com/shorts/yGddBaMTK2c

https://twitter.com/Euan_MacDonald/status/1820842087933169863

https://twitter.com/intermarium24/status/1821343176919073056

https://twitter.com/trip_to_valkiri/status/1821648643864326547

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1821650609055182918

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1821493811408760889

https://twitter.com/ukraine_map/status/1821210546609250379

https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/1820926453304701295

https://twitter.com/PStyle0ne1/status/1821776455761604808

https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1821607620274483684

https://twitter.com/VasBroughtToX/status/1821215725660319919

https://twitter.com/auto_glam/status/1821798879357968561

 

On August 6th elements of four Ukrainian brigades in an initial force of 2,000 men crossed the Ukrainian-Russian border into Russia's Kursk province opposite the small town of Sudzha. They disarmed and captured a sizeable Russian unit of FSB border guards at the border crossing, then quickly captured territory several kilometers in depth against light resistance, and had reconnaissance units fan out several more, so that Ukrainian presence was observed in over ten Russian settlements on just the first day of the invasion, and ultimately rising to twenty. By best estimates after three days 350 km2 of Russia lies under Ukrainian army control.

It is very clear that the Russian side was taken by surprise. Probably, as often happens, the Ukrainian build-up was to some extent observed and reported up the chain, but since it was deduced by the brass that a Ukrainian offensive here "wouldn't make sense" nothing was done. Reserves were not allocated and brought in in advance, and at least some units were not tactically and psychologically ready to face a large incursion (rather than special forces raids of 5-8 men which are common on both sides).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSvrNTfQPQY

Nonetheless, it should be noted that the advent of the small drone era has changed how Ukrainians and Russians conceive of defense, especially in inactive theaters. Rather than presenting a heavily manned line of contact that would present numerous targets for drones and drone-guided artillery, the advanced positions are lightly manned, with the main fortification line running some 10 kilometers behind them. (This was the Russian approach in 2023, and the Ukrainian approach in Vochansk earlier this year.) Thus some degree of Ukrainian penetration was always to be expected, even if the Russians had prepared perfectly.

That said, nothing should be taken away from the Ukrainian preparations which were meticulous and skillful. Communication towers in the area had been hit one by one in the weeks preceding, and a heavy concentration of air defenses, electronic warfare systems, and drones were assembled in support.

Moreover where the Russians in the May 2024 Kharkov offensive "solved" the problem of how to conduct rapid offense in the drone age, by falling back on infantry marches on foot through forests and swamps using infiltration tactics, the Ukrainians in Kursk have been able to showcase a combined-arms operation with a strong tank and mechanized component.

It should also be pointed out that the Ukrainian incursion takes place a wider context of Ukrainian manpower disadvantage and setbacks in Donetsk. Outnumbered, the Ukrainians have been steadily falling back in a number of important sectors in the south, especially on the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk axis, allowing Russian gains of up to 10 km2 per day, albeit in return for well over 100 dead on each side daily.

It is for this reason that as the news of the Ukrainian foray into Kursk hit, many Ukrainian commentators were initially critical and confused. With the Ukrainian forces in the south already on the back foot due to a manpower shortage, what sense did it make to divert some of the last reserves to open a new front? Especially since Russia does not use conscripts serving out their mandatory, universal national service in Ukraine, but it does use them on Russian borders. So in theory the Russians could fight this new Ukrainian offensive with just Rosgvardia, FSB border troops, and especially conscripts, without even having to divert any of the enlisted units from Ukraine.

But regardless of these risks, the operation presents several big upsides for Ukraine:

1. Moscow has been often repeating that Russia is open to peace but that any peace will have to be "based on realities as they exist on the ground". But with Ukraine in control of 300 square kilometers of Russia, it makes Putin's insistence on the "facts on the ground" formula quite comical.

2. In May Putin ordered an offensive to carve out what he deemed a "sanitary zone" on the Russian-Ukrainian border opposite the Russian city of Belgorod. Not only did that effort flounder within days, but humiliatingly for Putin, Zelensky has now matched Russian gains in Kharkov, with Ukrainian gains in Kursk, while playing a weaker hand.

3. In theory Russia can attempt to contain and roll back the Ukrainian offensive with conscript units, without transferring over units made up of enlisted men from Ukraine and weakening its offensive there, but these units are untested. And while all else being equal, 19-year old conscripts make for more dynamic troops than the 40-year-olds who make up the enlisted volunteer units, the all-conscript units on the border lack combat experience, equipment, and most of all leadership, with the bulk of best officers deployed to Ukraine. Thus it is not immediately clear that conscripts will be up to the task. Until they prove their mettle relying on them presents a risk for the Russian side, and forces a serious strategic dilemma on the Russian leadership.

Keep in mind that in the pre-war 2022 Russian army all-conscript units did not exist at all and were not foreseen. Conscripts were supposed to fill up positions in mixed units which would have placed them alongside numerous experienced professional soldiers ("kontraktniki"), and with an emphasis on filling supporting roles (loaders, drivers...).

4. The question of whether to pursue a defense and counter-offensive with conscripts also presents a serious political dilemma that has been foisted on Putin. Legally there are no obstacles to doing so. However ever since Moscow declared its annexation of four Ukrainian provinces in the south in September 2022, there have also been no legal obstacles to using conscripts serving out their mandatory national service in Ukraine, and yet this has never been done. Is Putin willing to send 19-year-olds into heavy combat and will he pay a political price on the home front if he does so? We don't know, but we know that so far he has gone to great lengths to avoid doing so. (Where Ukrainians are concerned men under 25 are exempt from mobilization wholesale and serve only if they volunteer.)

An additional political challenge for Putin lies in the fact that even should Russia recapture the lost settlements these are likely going to be leveled in the process with artillery and glide bombs.

5. There are many episodes of this war that Ukraine can and will remember with fondness. Episodes that served to lift its spirit, link its people in a shared experience, and even help to complete its national formation. Highlights such as the sinking of the Moskva cruiser, the lightning Kupyansk-Liman offensive of September 2022, the forcing of the Russian evacuation of Snake Island and of Kherson, and several others. However, overwhelmingly these feel-good moments happened in the first year of the war, and have been wholly absent in 2024. A nation at war does not live by bread alone — and the Ukrainian drive into Kursk province will at least for a short time remind Ukrainians of 2022 victories and link them in hope, anticipation, and pride. This is important and invaluable. Especially in a context where all other news is of a bleak meatgrinder and very small but unending retreats.

It remains to be seen if this strike will prove a good use of war potential for Ukraine in a purely material sense (and the answer is more likely to be no than yes), but in the non-material dimension of war it is likely to be a resounding and much needed success for Ukraine, even if it is eventually forced to retreat. (The caveat being that the big danger for the Ukrainians is if they try to hold onto for too long once they become enveloped as they did in Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Krynky, as commanded by Zelensky out of non-military calculations.)

All this said, the glacial, but relentless Russian advance in the south continues, especially in the Pokrovsk direction, chipping away 5-10 km2 every day. It is this main theater of the war that will have a greater influence on its outcome than any secondary actions in the north.

---

One interpretation of Ukrainian gains so far. The road to west in purple has been mined by Ukraine:

The Ukrainian push renders the railway line running through Sudzha unusable, cutting down the number of available railway lines from Kursk to Belgorod from two to one, slightly complicating Russian logistics:

In one interpretation the Ukrainian objectives are the towns of Rylsk and Lgov to the north, and the Kursk nuclear power plant to the northeast. Personally, I find this to be too ambitious, but food for thought nonetheless:

https://www.youtube.com/shorts/yGddBaMTK2c

https://twitter.com/Euan_MacDonald/status/1820842087933169863

https://twitter.com/intermarium24/status/1821343176919073056

https://twitter.com/trip_to_valkiri/status/1821648643864326547

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1821650609055182918

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1821493811408760889

https://twitter.com/ukraine_map/status/1821210546609250379

https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/1820926453304701295

https://twitter.com/PStyle0ne1/status/1821776455761604808

https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1821607620274483684

https://twitter.com/VasBroughtToX/status/1821215725660319919

https://twitter.com/auto_glam/status/1821798879357968561

 

Recently media has been posting that Gazprom has reported an annual operating loss of $7 billion — its first in twenty years.

However, I find there are other more interesting aspects to Gazprom's finances.

In 2024 Gazprom plans to spend $17 billion in capital investments, having spent $21 billion on the same in 2023, and $33 billion in 2022.

The decline from 2022 to 2023 is merely due to ruble devaluation. In ruble terms, 2 trillion were invested in each of these years, with 1.6 trillion to follow in 2024.

In three years then Gazprom will have spent $71 billion on new production, transport and refining (it also has an oil branch) capacity.

This compared to Russia spending $86 billion on the military in 2022, $109 billion in 2023, and $117 billion planned for 2024. This comes out to a combined $312 billion.

In other words, in three war years, (a war involving NATO with 100,000 Russians dead so far) Gazprom alone will have invested 23% of what Russia has invested into the war, into the gas business. 

$312 billion for the war, $71 billion for Gazprom to develop gas and oil fields, build pipelines, refineries, LNG terminals.

For more context, Gazprom capital investments in 2022 were equal to 1.4% of Russia's entire GDP. As well as 1.2 percent of GDP in 2023 and, 0.9 percent in 2024.

There are two ways to look at this. One is to say that it's good that Russia continues to make the investments that will sustain its revenue in the coming years and decades.

For example, Gazprom is contractually bound to up its export volume through Power of Siberia to China from 22 bcm to 38 bcm by 2025. That for one sounds like a project that ought to be completed, not least because the payoff is assured and will come soon.

However, in the energy business, the nature of most investments is such that they won't be recouped for decades, and in the meantime there is a war raging with 120 Russian dead daily.

There is an opposite argument to be made that Russia ought to stop these lavish peace projects and for a time being direct all energies to getting herself out of the Ukraine quagmire as soon as possible.

Instead, the approach Putin has landed on after September 2022 has been to resource the war in the way that can be sustained forever, but in a way that is indifferent to Russia's battlefield fortunes.

On the one hand, at 6% GDP war spending and low levels of forced mobilization relative to population size, Russia really isn't accumulating all that much war exhaustion, and can keep soldiering on forever.

But on the other hand, the current war investment can't guarantee much more than the sustainment of a conflict that is protracted and indecisive, with the only real path to its conclusion being that Ukraine's own war exhaustion eventually causes her to cry uncle.

Recently media has been posting that Gazprom has reported an annual operating loss of $7 billion — its first in twenty years.

However, I find there are other more interesting aspects to Gazprom's finances.

In 2024 Gazprom plans to spend $17 billion in capital investments, having spent $21 billion on the same in 2023, and $33 billion in 2022.

The decline from 2022 to 2023 is merely due to ruble devaluation. In ruble terms, 2 trillion were invested in each of these years, with 1.6 trillion to follow in 2024.

In three years then Gazprom will have spent $71 billion on new production, transport and refining (it also has an oil branch) capacity.

This compared to Russia spending $86 billion on the military in 2022, $109 billion in 2023, and $117 billion planned for 2024. This comes out to a combined $312 billion.

In other words, in three war years, (a war involving NATO with 100,000 Russians dead so far) Gazprom alone will have invested 23% of what Russia has invested into the war, into the gas business. 

$312 billion for the war, $71 billion for Gazprom to develop gas and oil fields, build pipelines, refineries, LNG terminals.

For more context, Gazprom capital investments in 2022 were equal to 1.4% of Russia's entire GDP. As well as 1.2 percent of GDP in 2023 and, 0.9 percent in 2024.

There are two ways to look at this. One is to say that it's good that Russia continues to make the investments that will sustain its revenue in the coming years and decades.

For example, Gazprom is contractually bound to up its export volume through Power of Siberia to China from 22 bcm to 38 bcm by 2025. That for one sounds like a project that ought to be completed, not least because the payoff is assured and will come soon.

However, in the energy business, the nature of most investments is such that they won't be recouped for decades, and in the meantime there is a war raging with 120 Russian dead daily.

There is an opposite argument to be made that Russia ought to stop these lavish peace projects and for a time being direct all energies to getting herself out of the Ukraine quagmire as soon as possible.

Instead, the approach Putin has landed on after September 2022 has been to resource the war in the way that can be sustained forever, but in a way that is indifferent to Russia's battlefield fortunes.

On the one hand, at 6% GDP war spending and low levels of forced mobilization relative to population size, Russia really isn't accumulating all that much war exhaustion, and can keep soldiering on forever.

But on the other hand, the current war investment can't guarantee much more than the sustainment of a conflict that is protracted and indecisive, with the only real path to its conclusion being that Ukraine's own war exhaustion eventually causes her to cry uncle.

On April 22 US Congress voted in the $61 billion "Ukraine Response" bill. On the same day it also voted in a $8.1 billion "Indo-Pacific" bill.

The latter allocates $1.9 billion to replace DoD arms that will be given, or have been given to Taiwan for free.

It also allocates some $1.7 billion for Taiwan to use to order arms from US companies.

$2.7 billion in weapons to Taipei in just one fiscal year for free.

Two days later on April 24 the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken traveled to China, and demanded that her government stops Chinese companies from selling electronic components and factory equipment to Russia.

Don't you just love the American Empire?

The US formally recognizes there exists only one China with a capital in Beijing. This from the US point of view makes Taipei a renegade government on sovereign Chinese territory. Nonetheless, the US gives away weapons to Taipei for free, while demanding China damages its economy and stops selling non-weapons to Russia for cold cash. (Nothing is said of machine tool exports to Ukraine and Western arms makers which China is also willing to fulfill.)

China already refrains from giving away weapons to Russia, and largely refrains from selling weapons and ammunition. Yet this is not enough, a hostile Empire that arms Taipei against China for free, demands that Beijing sanctions itself. Sanctions itself in order to help the Empire exhaust and humble Russia so that the Empire can then focus all of its resources on China alone.

https://twitter.com/BowesChay/status/1784356809173524591

And what's will all the utopianism anyway?

I can't believe anyone at State Department seriously thought Beijing would comply with these shocking demands, and that they would do anything but offend and aggravate the Chinese, so why even bring them up?  

Did Washington seriously not expect that eventually Russia would start investing in its military production capacity, and that China would make its machine tools available for that? (As she makes them available to anyone willing to pay for them.)

The only shocking thing is how long it took for Russia to start doing it. Did DC think the inactivity would last forever?

Now DC will pass some punitive sanctions on Chinese manufacturers and banks that will delay some shipments and make others marginally more expensive, but most of all will help confirm to Beijing that DC sees it as an enemy.

BTW, the Russians are not entirely dependent on machine tool imports. Since 2014 they have been building CNC machines of their own — but they lack the capacity to build them on a truly grand scale like the Chinese.

https://twitter.com/CarlZha/status/1784315196162597007

https://twitter.com/3rdwavemedia/status/1784396463684088105

https://twitter.com/tmpnam/status/1784441103007015422

https://twitter.com/RSA_Observer/status/1784264803348799567

https://twitter.com/BRICSinfo/status/1783989372846563788

 

On April 22 US Congress voted in the $61 billion "Ukraine Response" bill. On the same day it also voted in a $8.1 billion "Indo-Pacific" bill.

The latter allocates $1.9 billion to replace DoD arms that will be given, or have been given to Taiwan for free.

It also allocates some $1.7 billion for Taiwan to use to order arms from US companies.

$2.7 billion in weapons to Taipei in just one fiscal year for free.

Two days later on April 24 the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken traveled to China, and demanded that her government stops Chinese companies from selling electronic components and factory equipment to Russia.

Don't you just love the American Empire?

The US formally recognizes there exists only one China with a capital in Beijing. This from the US point of view makes Taipei a renegade government on sovereign Chinese territory. Nonetheless, the US gives away weapons to Taipei for free, while demanding China damages its economy and stops selling non-weapons to Russia for cold cash. (Nothing is said of machine tool exports to Ukraine and Western arms makers which China is also willing to fulfill.)

China already refrains from giving away weapons to Russia, and largely refrains from selling weapons and ammunition. Yet this is not enough, a hostile Empire that arms Taipei against China for free, demands that Beijing sanctions itself. Sanctions itself in order to help the Empire exhaust and humble Russia so that the Empire can then focus all of its resources on China alone.

https://twitter.com/BowesChay/status/1784356809173524591

And what's will all the utopianism anyway?

I can't believe anyone at State Department seriously thought Beijing would comply with these shocking demands, and that they would do anything but offend and aggravate the Chinese, so why even bring them up?  

Did Washington seriously not expect that eventually Russia would start investing in its military production capacity, and that China would make its machine tools available for that? (As she makes them available to anyone willing to pay for them.)

The only shocking thing is how long it took for Russia to start doing it. Did DC think the inactivity would last forever?

Now DC will pass some punitive sanctions on Chinese manufacturers and banks that will delay some shipments and make others marginally more expensive, but most of all will help confirm to Beijing that DC sees it as an enemy.

BTW, the Russians are not entirely dependent on machine tool imports. Since 2014 they have been building CNC machines of their own — but they lack the capacity to build them on a truly grand scale like the Chinese.

https://twitter.com/CarlZha/status/1784315196162597007

https://twitter.com/3rdwavemedia/status/1784396463684088105

https://twitter.com/tmpnam/status/1784441103007015422

https://twitter.com/RSA_Observer/status/1784264803348799567

https://twitter.com/BRICSinfo/status/1783989372846563788

 

It's June 2006, the height of the Iraq War. Luckily for you, you're not an orphan in Fallujah, but just another suburbanite in Fayetteville, North Carolina. It's a sleepy summer Saturday morning. As you're browsing the morning paper, your child is flipping channels. As he does so you catch half a second of a Bush speech. You'd normally never subject yourself to a Dubya speech, but this is unusual — why would the President be giving a speech at such an early hour? You tell the kid to switch back and your jaw drops.

Bush says that amid a tough and existential struggle against terrorism, a new Benedict Arnold has emerged to stab the nation in the back, to bring anarchy, fratricide, surrender and defeat. In light of that, Bush has issued orders to the DoD to deal harshly with this deadly internal threat. All who have taken up arms against the United States in this criminal and traitorous adventure consciously will answer to the people and be punished.

What the hell is going on? Civil war??? Bush mentions Blackwater and that Savannah has fallen but offers no specifics. You scramble to the internet to find out what's going on.

Turns out Blackwater is patrolling the streets of Savannah, has set up checkpoints around the city, and has even cordoned off the 4-star US Army general in the nearby Fort Stewart HQ along with his staff, effectively subjecting him to house arrest. What is more, 4000 Blackwaterites are marching up north from Savannah toward Arlington and Washington. Their stated goal is subjecting DoD chief Donald Rumsfeld to the same sort of house arrest and forcing his dismissal, but speculation is rife they're hoping their dash to the capital area destabilizes and topples Bush himself.

This might normally be called a mutiny, but seeing Blackwater is a separate organization from the US military, and a private one at that, the proper term is a coup. Like some hapless Panamanian, you now have the dubious privilege of watching the progress of a coup in motion against your national government in real-time. A coup that will determine your future, and of your country, and that you're helpless to influence. Unthinkable! What has this country sunk to?!

As you try to follow the advance of the Blackwater column on the interwebs, the news comes in. The mercenaries have shot down a US Army helicopter. And another. And another. US Army deaths are almost certain. And in an hour or two the private army will be passing through your Fayetteville.

Indeed, just as they enter your town they blow out a USAF surveillance plane out of the sky above it, as videos of the incident that hit your Facebook soon confirm. The fuckers! You aren't even that much of a support-the-troops guy, you were never for the war in the first place, you backed Howard Dean. But this is too much! Somebody is killing US military men right on US soil — and it's a fucking corporation!

You never thought you'd say this but this is one Bush war you're going to support! Dubya, go and ring Erik Prince's neck! Crush these merc killers of troops! Sure, after it’s done Bush will have to answer for allowing the situation to get so far from under him, and for getting in bed with these entitled criminals in the first place, but for now, he needs to do as promised and unleash the Pentagon against these murder yuppies!

Your first foray into backing a Bush war does not go too well. As far as you can see resistance to Blackwater consists of local mayors taking the initiative to improvise makeshift roadblocks, and Army engineers reportedly blowing up a few bridges. There are a few videos of what seems to be an aircraft targeting the Blackwater column, but it appears others were downed “preemptively” without ever firing on the mercenaries. There is talk of a “defensive line” being constructed but that is only at Washington outskirts. If after the jaw-dropping “stab in the back” speech you expected a Bush hammer to come down on Blackwater there isn't one in sight, which allows the 4000-merc column to cover 1000 km from Savannah to Virginia, coming within 300 km of the capital, mainly unopposed.

Instead, come evening, the exact opposite news hits. After the mediation of Tony Blair an agreement has been reached and Bush, the United States government, Erik Prince and Blackwater are back to being friends and back in business. Blackwater recruitment billboards that authorities had started to take down are being put right back up, and the Blackwater skyscraper in New York that was closed by the police is right back to being open again.

What the bloody hell?! After that speech on how the wartime backstabbers will face the punishment of the people? After the Blackwaterites shot up to half a dozen US aircraft, killing at least a dozen US airmen in a day?? They're going right back on the taxpayer payroll?? What kind of a godawful banana republic is this?!?

Read the rest at Anti-Empire's Substack: LINK

(It's a bunch of work to copy this to two places, time better spent researching.)

It's June 2006, the height of the Iraq War. Luckily for you, you're not an orphan in Fallujah, but just another suburbanite in Fayetteville, North Carolina. It's a sleepy summer Saturday morning. As you're browsing the morning paper, your child is flipping channels. As he does so you catch half a second of a Bush speech. You'd normally never subject yourself to a Dubya speech, but this is unusual — why would the President be giving a speech at such an early hour? You tell the kid to switch back and your jaw drops.

Bush says that amid a tough and existential struggle against terrorism, a new Benedict Arnold has emerged to stab the nation in the back, to bring anarchy, fratricide, surrender and defeat. In light of that, Bush has issued orders to the DoD to deal harshly with this deadly internal threat. All who have taken up arms against the United States in this criminal and traitorous adventure consciously will answer to the people and be punished.

What the hell is going on? Civil war??? Bush mentions Blackwater and that Savannah has fallen but offers no specifics. You scramble to the internet to find out what's going on.

Turns out Blackwater is patrolling the streets of Savannah, has set up checkpoints around the city, and has even cordoned off the 4-star US Army general in the nearby Fort Stewart HQ along with his staff, effectively subjecting him to house arrest. What is more, 4000 Blackwaterites are marching up north from Savannah toward Arlington and Washington. Their stated goal is subjecting DoD chief Donald Rumsfeld to the same sort of house arrest and forcing his dismissal, but speculation is rife they're hoping their dash to the capital area destabilizes and topples Bush himself.

This might normally be called a mutiny, but seeing Blackwater is a separate organization from the US military, and a private one at that, the proper term is a coup. Like some hapless Panamanian, you now have the dubious privilege of watching the progress of a coup in motion against your national government in real-time. A coup that will determine your future, and of your country, and that you're helpless to influence. Unthinkable! What has this country sunk to?!

As you try to follow the advance of the Blackwater column on the interwebs, the news comes in. The mercenaries have shot down a US Army helicopter. And another. And another. US Army deaths are almost certain. And in an hour or two the private army will be passing through your Fayetteville.

Indeed, just as they enter your town they blow out a USAF surveillance plane out of the sky above it, as videos of the incident that hit your Facebook soon confirm. The fuckers! You aren't even that much of a support-the-troops guy, you were never for the war in the first place, you backed Howard Dean. But this is too much! Somebody is killing US military men right on US soil — and it's a fucking corporation!

You never thought you'd say this but this is one Bush war you're going to support! Dubya, go and ring Erik Prince's neck! Crush these merc killers of troops! Sure, after it’s done Bush will have to answer for allowing the situation to get so far from under him, and for getting in bed with these entitled criminals in the first place, but for now, he needs to do as promised and unleash the Pentagon against these murder yuppies!

Your first foray into backing a Bush war does not go too well. As far as you can see resistance to Blackwater consists of local mayors taking the initiative to improvise makeshift roadblocks, and Army engineers reportedly blowing up a few bridges. There are a few videos of what seems to be an aircraft targeting the Blackwater column, but it appears others were downed “preemptively” without ever firing on the mercenaries. There is talk of a “defensive line” being constructed but that is only at Washington outskirts. If after the jaw-dropping “stab in the back” speech you expected a Bush hammer to come down on Blackwater there isn't one in sight, which allows the 4000-merc column to cover 1000 km from Savannah to Virginia, coming within 300 km of the capital, mainly unopposed.

Instead, come evening, the exact opposite news hits. After the mediation of Tony Blair an agreement has been reached and Bush, the United States government, Erik Prince and Blackwater are back to being friends and back in business. Blackwater recruitment billboards that authorities had started to take down are being put right back up, and the Blackwater skyscraper in New York that was closed by the police is right back to being open again.

What the bloody hell?! After that speech on how the wartime backstabbers will face the punishment of the people? After the Blackwaterites shot up to half a dozen US aircraft, killing at least a dozen US airmen in a day?? They're going right back on the taxpayer payroll?? What kind of a godawful banana republic is this?!?

Read the rest at Anti-Empire's Substack: LINK

(It's a bunch of work to copy this to two places, time better spent researching.)

Interestingly, the US does not buy artillery shells from the corporate defense sector, but instead produces them in government-owned munitions plants. (Albeit a contractor is apparently hired to operate the taxpayer-owned plants.)

Anyhow, at the start of the war these American armories were making 14,000 155 mm artillery rounds.

After the war started the US Army invested $1.45 billion to expand the production capacity. (It is not clear to me if this money was allocated in May 2022 or December 2022. The latter seems likelier.)

The result was that by October 2023 the production had doubled to 28,000 rounds monthly.

In November 2023 the Army allocated a further $1.5 billion to invest in capacity.

And the passing of the "Ukraine aid" bill last week allocates yet another $3.1 billion to expand production.

Some of the money will go toward building an entirely new ammunition plant in Texas that will be the most automated to date.

On October 2023 Army said it was planning to be building roughly 37 thousand rounds per month by April 2024, 60 thousand by October 2024, and 100 thousand by October 2025.

Thus 18 months from now the US will be producing over 3300 rounds daily.

Some of these will go toward replenishing the partly depleted US stockpile, but I predict that as long as the war rages the majority will be going to Ukraine.

Currently Russia fires about 6000 artillery rounds daily, while the Ukrainians are back to firing just 1000. (They were firing up to 5000-6000 themselves during their attempted 2023 offensive.)

As we have seen this is a temporary state of affairs. US capacity to supply Ukraine with shells is increasing quite rapidly. The EU has been slower in ramping up, but its capacity is rising as well.

Some two years from now the Ukrainians could themselves be firing 5000 rounds daily.

By failing to knock out Ukraine quickly, Russia has granted Washington the opportunity to beef up Kiev and greatly intensify the fratricidal Slavic slaughter.

Interestingly, the US does not buy artillery shells from the corporate defense sector, but instead produces them in government-owned munitions plants. (Albeit a contractor is apparently hired to operate the taxpayer-owned plants.)

Anyhow, at the start of the war these American armories were making 14,000 155 mm artillery rounds.

After the war started the US Army invested $1.45 billion to expand the production capacity. (It is not clear to me if this money was allocated in May 2022 or December 2022. The latter seems likelier.)

The result was that by October 2023 the production had doubled to 28,000 rounds monthly.

In November 2023 the Army allocated a further $1.5 billion to invest in capacity.

And the passing of the "Ukraine aid" bill last week allocates yet another $3.1 billion to expand production.

Some of the money will go toward building an entirely new ammunition plant in Texas that will be the most automated to date.

On October 2023 Army said it was planning to be building roughly 37 thousand rounds per month by April 2024, 60 thousand by October 2024, and 100 thousand by October 2025.

Thus 18 months from now the US will be producing over 3300 rounds daily.

Some of these will go toward replenishing the partly depleted US stockpile, but I predict that as long as the war rages the majority will be going to Ukraine.

Currently Russia fires about 6000 artillery rounds daily, while the Ukrainians are back to firing just 1000. (They were firing up to 5000-6000 themselves during their attempted 2023 offensive.)

As we have seen this is a temporary state of affairs. US capacity to supply Ukraine with shells is increasing quite rapidly. The EU has been slower in ramping up, but its capacity is rising as well.

Some two years from now the Ukrainians could themselves be firing 5000 rounds daily.

By failing to knock out Ukraine quickly, Russia has granted Washington the opportunity to beef up Kiev and greatly intensify the fratricidal Slavic slaughter.